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Quantum bit commitment has long been known to be impossible. Nevertheless, just as in the
classical case, imposing certain constraints on the power of the parties may enable the construction of
asymptotically secure protocols. Here, we introduce a quantum bit commitment protocol and prove
that it is asymptotically secure if cheating is restricted to Gaussian operations. This protocol exploits
continuous-variable quantum optical carriers, for which such a Gaussian constraint is experimentally
relevant as the high optical nonlinearity needed to effect deterministic non-Gaussian cheating is
inaccessible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is probably one of
most studied quantum cryptographic primitive, just af-
ter quantum key distribution (see, e.g., [1]). It belongs to
the class of mistrustful cryptography problems, which in-
volve two parties (Alice and Bob) who do not trust each
other. More specifically, bit commitment is a primitive in
which Alice commits to a certain bit while this bit should
remain hidden to Bob until Alice later reveals its value.
In the first stage, called “commit phase”, Alice locks her
bit in such a way that it is hidden, and sends it to Bob.
The protocol is said to be “concealing” if Bob cannot
cheat by learning information about this bit before the
second stage. In this second stage, called “unveil phase”,
Alice sends information to Bob so that he can unlock the
bit and find its value. The protocol is said to be “bind-
ing”if Alice cannot cheat by changing the value of the bit
once she has committed to it. A bit commitment proto-
col is secure if it prevents Alice and Bob from cheating,
that is, if it is both binding and concealing.
The original proof of the impossibility of QBC due to
Mayers consists of two steps [2]. In the first, which is
the most subtle one and will not be discussed here, one
shows that the security of any QBC reduces to the secu-
rity of a generic QBC scenario as described hereunder.
The second step is then to show that this generic QBC
scenario, also known as a “purification”QBC protocol [3],
is insecure [4]. In this scenario, Alice uses a bipartite
Hilbert space Hp ⊗ Ht, which is the tensor product of
the so-called “proof”and “token”spaces. Alice chooses to
commit the bit b (0 or 1) and prepares one of the two
orthogonal states |χb〉 in the total Hilbert space by ap-
plying a unitary transformation Ub on a state |ψ〉, that
is, |χb〉 = Ub |ψ〉. In the Schmidt representation, these
states may be written as
|χ0〉 =
∑
i
ai |pi〉 |ti〉 , |χ1〉 =
∑
i
a′i |p′i〉 |t′i〉 (1)
In the commit phase, Alice transmits to Bob the token
system lying in Ht, which is in state ρb = trp|χb〉〈χb|.
In the unveil phase, Alice transmits to Bob the proof
system lying in Hp, so Bob can determine the value of
the committed bit b by projectively measuring the state
|χb〉 using orthogonal projectors. Now, the insecurity
of this generic QBC protocol against cheating can eas-
ily be proven. The requirement that Bob gains no in-
formation before the unveil phase simply translates into
ρ1 = ρ0, or equivalently |t′i〉 = |ti〉 (up to a phase) and
a′i = ai, ∀i. Remarkably, if this condition is fulfilled, Al-
ice can perfectly cheat after the commit phase by chang-
ing {|pi〉} → {|p′i〉} with some appropriate unitary trans-
formations Up ⊗ 1 on her proof system. This implies
that quantum bit commitment cannot be both perfectly
concealing and binding [2, 4].
This proof leaves open the possibility that if certain
restrictions are imposed on the operations available to
the parties, a QBC may be constructed that is secure or
at least partially secure. There is some literature on this
topic for both classical and quantum bit commitment (see
for instance [5] and references therein, or [6–8]), with pos-
itive and negative results. What we shall examine here
is a simpler and less studied scenario, where restrictions
are imposed on Alice’s cheating operations only. One can
easily construct a secure QBC that falls into this cate-
gory: simply encode the committed bit into a subspace
of the total Hilbert space that remains invariant under
Alice’s permitted local transformations on the proof sys-
tem. To illustrate this idea, let us give a trivial example
using a system consisting of two spin-1/2 particles. Let
us encode 0 and 1 into the eigenvalue of the total spin
2S
2 = (S1 + S2)
2
by choosing
|χ0〉 = |s = 0,m = 0〉 = (|↑〉 |↓〉 − |↓〉 |↑〉) /
√
2
|χ1〉 = |s = 1,m = 0〉 = (|↑〉 |↓〉+ |↓〉 |↑〉) /
√
2 (2)
where s stands for the total spin quantum number and
m for the quantum number associated with its projection
onto the z axis. It is obvious that the condition ρ1 = ρ0
is satisfied and that the protocol is not secure if Alice has
all local operations (i.e., the algebra SU(2)⊗1) at her dis-
posal. However, let us suppose that her local operations
are restricted to a subgroup of SU(2)⊗ 1 that commutes
with S2. For the case of spins there is no such subgroup,
but one can still restrict Alice to use the trivial operation
generated by S1, that is, a rotation around the (1, 1, 1)
vector in the Bloch sphere representation. Under this
restriction, the protocol becomes secure since cheating
would require a rotation around the z axis or (0, 0, 1) vec-
tor, i.e., an operation known as a “phase gate”in which
|↑〉 remains unchanged while |↓〉 gets a minus sign.
This example is rather unrealistic since there is no ob-
jective reason for justifying this restriction on Alice’s lo-
cal operations while, in the total Hilbert space Hp ⊗Ht,
she can apply the global operations that generate |χb〉 as
defined in Eq. (2). On the contrary, in the QBC scheme
that we introduce in this paper, it will appear that a
specific constraint on Alice’s cheating operations can be
experimentally well motivated, giving rise to an asymp-
totically secure protocol. We will devise a “continuous-
variable”QBC protocol based on quantum states lying
in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which can be
realized as states of the electromagnetic field (see, e.g.,
[9, 10]). In this quantum optical QBC protocol, we shall
assume that Alice is restricted to carry out Gaussian op-
erations only, which is consistent with the current exper-
imental ability to engineer quantum states of light in a
deterministic way. Only a few very challenging exper-
iments have been successful to prepare and manipulate
non-Gaussian states of traveling light (see, e.g., [11–16]),
and all of these schemes are based on heralded photon
subtraction [17] or addition [18], hence are probabilistic
in nature. A deterministic non-Gaussian operation would
require high optical nonlinearities that are not accessible
in the laboratory today. Since probabilistic cheating does
not endeavor the security of QBC if the success probabil-
ity is low (this even holds true otherwise, though in the
asymptotic protocol only), such a restriction to Gaussian
cheating operations is justified in the context of QBC.
Thus, although it is not impossible, in principle, to re-
alize deterministic non-Gaussian optical operations based
on giant nonlinearities, there is a natural boundary
separating the Gaussian from non-Gaussian determinis-
tic operations, and it is relevant to investigate a QBC
scenario where Alice is not allowed to carry out non-
Gaussian cheating operations. This scenario has been
introduced in [8], where a strong “no-go theorem” was
derived: secure quantum bit commitment is forbidden in
continuous-variable protocols where both players are re-
stricted to use Gaussian states and operations. In other
words, if the protocol is built on Gaussian states |χb〉, it is
sufficient for the players to carry out Gaussian operations
in order to cheat perfectly. Therefore, it was concluded in
[8] that a secure QBC protocol with Gaussian constrained
cheating, if it exists, should necessarily be built on non-
Gaussian states |χb〉. In the present paper, we prove that
this holds by exhibiting an explicit secure non-Gaussian
QBC protocol. It should not be viewed as a directly us-
able QBC protocol since, as we will see, it still requires
the use of either a quantum memory or a very long time
delay in an optical interferometer. Instead, our goal is to
point towards a conceptual method to reach asymptotic
security in continuous-variable QBC under Gaussian con-
straints. A restricted proof-of-principle demonstration of
this protocol seems nevertheless feasible within the cur-
rently available technologies.
In Section II, we define our QBC protocol and ana-
lyze first how it works when the two parties are honest.
In Section III, we go beyond the honest scheme and in-
vestigate Alice’s best possible cheating if restricted to
Gaussian operations. In Section IV, we consider Bob’s
cheating, which allows us to probe the trade-off between
Alice and Bob’s cheating. In Section V, we suggest an
improvement to the scheme in order to make it asymp-
totically secure, while we conclude in Section VI.
II. THE HONEST SCHEME
Let us consider the following purification protocol [3]
in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, which is in di-
rect analogy with the above-mentioned spin-1/2 example.
The 0 and 1 values of the committed bit b are encoded
into the orthogonal two-mode non-Gaussian states,
|χ0〉 = (|α〉 |−α〉 − |−α〉 |α〉) /
√
2
(
1− e−4|α|2)
|χ1〉 = (|α〉 |−α〉+ |−α〉 |α〉) /
√
2
(
1 + e−4|α|
2
)
(3)
where |α〉 = D (α) |0〉 = exp (αa† − α∗a) |0〉 is a coher-
ent state of complex amplitude α. Moving from orthogo-
nal qubit states |0〉 and |1〉 in a two-dimensional Hilbert
space to near-orthogonal coherent states |α〉 and |−α〉
(α ≫ 1) in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space has al-
ready been put forward in the context of quantum com-
putation [19, 20], and our treatment of QBC follows on
this. Note that the states of Eq. (3) correspond to entan-
gled “Schro¨dinger cat”states, whose experimental gener-
ation has recently been demonstrated in [21].
Let us suppose that α & 2 (in practice, this is suffi-
cient to be very close to the asymptotic situation where
|α〉 and |−α〉 are orthogonal). One of the two modes (to-
ken system) of state |χb〉 is sent to Bob in the commit
phase, while the second mode (proof system) is kept by
Alice. At this stage, Bob can almost not distinguish be-
tween |χ0〉 and |χ1〉 whatever measurement he uses since
ρ1 ≃ ρ0. On the other hand, it is immediate to see how
Bob can distinguish between these mutually orthogonal
3states |χb〉 in the total Hilbert space during the unveil
phase. Consider the two modes of |χb〉 as incident beams
on the two ports of a balanced beam splitter, effecting
the unitary operation B. By adjusting the phases, the
outgoing state |χ′b〉 = B |χb〉 can be written as
|χ′0〉 = (|α′〉 − |−α′〉) |0〉 /
√
2
(
1− e−2|α′|2)
|χ′1〉 = (|α′〉+ |−α′〉) |0〉 /
√
2
(
1 + e−2|α′|
2
)
(4)
which is the tensor product of a “Schro¨dinger cat”state
of amplitude α′ =
√
2α and the vacuum state. Note
that the cat state is odd (even) for b = 0 (b = 1). The
states |χ′b〉 are perfectly distinguishable by applying a
photon number parity measurement on the first mode,
corresponding to the observable P = (−1)a†a, that is,
〈χ′0|P ⊗ 1 |χ′0〉 = −1, 〈χ′1|P ⊗ 1 |χ′1〉 = 1 (5)
Note that this measurement may be realized by photon
counting using a number-resolving photodetector as has
very recently become available (see, e.g., [22, 23])
Now, we are ready to describe the honest QBC proto-
col as illustrated in Fig. 1. In the commit phase, Alice
prepares one of the states |χ′b〉 as defined in Eq. (4) ac-
cording to the value of the bit b she wants to commit. Us-
ing a balanced beam splitter, she converts |χ′b〉 into |χb〉
as defined in Eq. (3), and then sends the token mode (in
state ρb) to Bob. In the unveil phase, she sends the proof
mode to Bob, which he combines with his token mode in
a balanced beam splitter to obtain the unentangled state
|χ′b〉 as originally held by Alice. Finally, Bob discards the
mode corresponding to the vacuum state and performs a
parity measurement on the cat state in order to unveil
the value of bit b. We assume that the interferometric
scheme is perfectly balanced and that the holding phase
(the period after the commit phase but before the unveil
phase) can be achieved by inserting equal time delays in
the two branches of the interferometer. Ideally, a quan-
tum memory should of course be available to Bob in order
to achieve a longer-time holding phase.
III. ALICE’S BEST CHEATING STRATEGY
Let us first assume that the QBC protocol is conceal-
ing, that is, secure against any measurement by Bob try-
ing to cheat during the holding phase. In other words,
we assume that the coherent state amplitude α & 2, so
that ρ1 ≃ ρ0. Under this assumption, which we will make
rigorous in Section IV, we can investigate the security of
the protocol against Alice’s cheating strategies.
A. Non-Gaussian cheating
Obviously, if all local operations on the proof mode
were available to Alice, then she could convert the value
          Commit                     Holding            Unveil      phase
token mode
proof mode
Alice                              50:50 Beam Splitter
Bob                                 Photon Counter                                     
  |χ'>
ρ
b   |χ >b   
b|cat>
|0>
|cat>
|0>
FIG. 1: Honest protocol. The state |cat〉 can either be an even
or an odd Schro¨dinger’s cat state of amplitude α′ depending
on the bit b to be committed, see the first mode in Eq. (4).
The token mode is transmitted in the commit phase, while the
proof mode is transmitted in the unveil phase. Bob combines
the two modes at a balanced beam splitter and measures the
photon number parity in the first mode.
of her committed bit at will during the holding phase.
However, this would require her ability to perform a no-
tably non-Gaussian local operation, where |α〉 remains
unchanged while |−α〉 gets a minus sign. Such an op-
eration, which can be viewed as the continuous-variable
analogue to the phase gate that we referred to in the case
of spin-1/2 particles, corresponds in the limit α ≫ 1 to
the non-Gaussian unitary
UNG = D (−α) exp [ipi |0〉〈0|]D (α) (6)
It cannot be implemented deterministically with accessi-
ble optical nonlinearities, so for cheating one would have
to turn to probabilistic schemes based on heralded pho-
ton subtraction, whose probability of success is very low
[24, 25]. Therefore, we may fairly impose such a Gaus-
sian restriction on Alice’s cheating operation in the hold-
ing phase (or assume that the probability of success of
such a non-Gaussian local operation is negligible).
One may rightly argue, of course, that within the cur-
rent experimental settings, the generation of Schro¨dinger
cat states as needed in Alice’s preparation of |χ′b〉 can-
not be deterministic either. However, during the commit
phase, Alice can determine whether |χ′b〉 has been suc-
cessfully prepared or not, and, if not, she can repeat the
operation again until it is successful (or send the state to
Bob but later notify him of the failed trial). Thus, the
probabilistic occurrence of a failure is not detrimental
to the commit phase, while it prevents an efficient non-
Gaussian cheating. In other words, the Gaussian restric-
tion we impose on Alice’s cheating operations is justified
within the present experimental limitations, while, at the
same time, Alice’s preparation of the non-Gaussian state
4|χ′b〉 needed to overcome the no-go theorem [8] can very
well be done probabilistically.
B. Gaussian cheating
The essential question to be answered now is to find
the best cheating strategy for Alice if only Gaussian op-
erations are available to her. Here, “best”should be in-
terpreted according to the unveil procedure that has been
defined for the honest protocol, that is, when Bob uses a
balanced beam splitter and performs a parity measure-
ment on the first mode. If, when Alice cheats, Bob recon-
structs the state |χ′#〉 at the output of his beam splitter
while Alice had initially committed |χ′b〉, the best cheat-
ing strategy is obviously the one where 〈χ′#|P ⊗ 1|χ′#〉
reaches the closest value to 〈χ′¬b|P ⊗ 1|χ′¬b〉, where ¬b is
the complement of the bit b. The probability of success
of the best Gaussian cheating strategy can be measured
with Alice’s “maximum control”Cmax, as defined in [3].
Let us review the operations available to Alice. The
most general Gaussian unitary operation UG on a sin-
gle mode is an exponential of a linear combination
of the elements of the two-photon algebra h6, namely{
1 , a, a2, a†, a†
2
, 1/2 + a†a
}
, so it relies on 6 real param-
eters. This general Gaussian transformation can also be
casted as a sequence of standard optical operations, for
instance [26]
UG = D (β)U (ϕ)S (r)U (θ) (7)
where S (r) = exp
[
r
2
(
a2 − a†2)] is a squeezing of param-
eter r of the x quadrature, U (θ) = exp
(
iθa†a
)
is a phase
rotation of angle θ, and D (β) = exp
(
βa† − β∗a) is a dis-
placement of complex coherent amplitude β. We ignore
the global phase operation, which plays no role here.
The information about the committed bit b is encoded
into the parity of the first mode of |χ′b〉, or, adopting a
phase-space point of view, in the interference pattern of
the Wigner function (~ = 1),
W (x, p) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
exp (ipq)
〈
x− q
2
∣∣∣ ρ
∣∣∣x+ q
2
〉
dq (8)
Note that the quadrature variables (x, p) in phase space
are defined here using the convention a = (x + ip)/
√
2.
This phase-space interpretation, which will be very useful
in the following, originates from the relation between the
mean parity and the Wigner function at the origin in
phase space, namely
W (0, 0) =
1
pi
〈P 〉. (9)
The interference pattern of the Wigner function of the
Schro¨dinger cat state |χ′b〉 – hence the parity information
– is smoothed out during the commit phase since Alice
looses a handle on the token system, and it is revived
in the unveil phase once the token and proof systems
can be measured jointly. One can visually understand
this smoothing out procedure by comparing the Wigner
function of the first mode in Eq. (4) during the commit
phase (before the beam splitter) with the Wigner func-
tion of the traced out mode in Eq. (3) during the holding
phase. What we need to analyze is the effect on the mean
parity 〈P 〉 of the first mode of |χ′b〉 when Alice applies
any Gaussian unitary UG on the proof mode of |χb〉. The
most general operation is actually a Gaussian CP map,
but we will argue later on that the best cheating is nec-
essarily a Gaussian unitary.
In the simplest scenario, involving displacements only,
Alice can for example displace the proof system by d
along the positive p quadrature direction. In the unveil-
ing phase, Bob will then get the initially committed cat
state displaced by −d/√2 along the p quadrature, where
the factor
√
2 is due to the second beam splitter. In
other words, Alice can alter the parity of the unveiled
state by freely displacing the origin of phase-space to an-
other point of the interference pattern where the Wigner
function has another value, even possibly the opposite
sign. We will now prove that this simplest scenario ac-
tually provides the best Gaussian cheating strategy for
Alice, so that no squeezing or phase-rotation is helpful.
The key observation is that the most general Gaussian
unitary of Eq. (7) corresponds to a special case of an
affine transformation in phase-space [27], namely a linear
symplectic transformation followed by a translation. In-
tuitively, this means that the Wigner function of the ini-
tial state may be displaced, squeezed, or rotated, but its
maximum and minimum values Wmax,min remain invari-
ant under these operations. Alternatively, using Eq. (9),
this means that the maximum and minimum values of
the mean parity 〈Pˆ 〉max,min that can be reached under
Gaussian unitaries are invariant for a given input state.
They can be reached simply by translating the Wigner
function in such a way that the origin is moved towards
the highest peak or the deepest dip in phase space, re-
spectively, with no squeezing or rotation needed.
Remember that, when cheating, Alice can only apply
her Gaussian operation on the proof mode, not on the
token mode. However, since Bob only checks the first
outgoing mode of his beam splitter (the one containing
the cat state whose parity encodes b), an arbitrary dis-
placement on this mode can be achieved via a displace-
ment of the proof mode only, so Alice can indeed freely
translate the Wigner function of the cat state. Now,
leaving displacements asides, if Alice’s cheating opera-
tion involves a rotation or squeezing operation, the out-
going modes of Bob’s beam splitter become inevitably
entangled, so the unveiled state becomes mixed. Since
mixing can only wash out the interference pattern, the
maximum parity 〈P 〉max can only decrease while 〈P 〉min
can only increase. Thus, rotation and squeezing can only
make cheating worse, and are useless to Alice. The same
reasoning also implies that a Gaussian CP map cannot
do better than a Gaussian unitary since it eventually im-
5plies tracing over some ancillary system after applying a
Gaussian unitary onto the joint system, hence smearing
out the Wigner function.
This confirms that Alice’s best Gaussian cheating
strategy for reaching the target bit value ¬b = 0 (1) is by
displacing her proof system so that Bob obtains the orig-
inally committed cat state |χ′b〉 displaced in such a way
that the minimum (maximum) value of its Wigner func-
tion Wmin (Wmax) is now located at the origin. Perfect
cheating will be achieved if Wmin = −1 (Wmax=1).
C. Alice’s maximum control Cmax
To illustrate this optimal Gaussian cheating, suppose
that Alice has initially committed the bit b = 0 (odd
Schro¨dinger cat with 〈χ′0|P ⊗ 1|χ′0〉 = −1) and at-
tempts to cheat during the holding phase so that Bob
would measure a bit ¬b = 1 (even Schro¨dinger cat with
〈χ′#|P ⊗ 1|χ′#〉 = 1) in the unveil phase. The optimal
cheating strategy is easy to understand in Fig. 2, where
we have plotted the Wigner function of the initially com-
mitted cat state. Alice needs to displace her proof system
by
√
2 d along the p quadrature, so that |χ′#〉 becomes the
original odd cat state displaced by−d along the p quadra-
ture (equivalently, the origin of phase space is shifted
upwards by d as illustrated by an arrow in Fig. 2). The
parameter d is just the distance (along the p quadrature
direction) from the origin to the first maximum of the
interference pattern, which is also the global maximum
of the Wigner function.
For a cat state of amplitude α′ there is no analytical
expression for d as a function of α′, and one has to nu-
merically solve the equation
p cos
(
2
√
2pα′
)
+
√
2α sin
(
2
√
2pα′
)
= pe−2α
′2
(10)
for p. The best cheating is then a displacement by d,
which corresponds to the smallest positive and non-zero
solution of Eq. (10). Let us analyze precisely the effect
of such a cheating in the specific example of Fig. 2, that
is, when Alice commits an odd cat state of amplitude
α′ = 3/
√
2. By solving Eq. (10), we get that the best
Gaussian cheating requires a displacement of d = 0.496.
The corresponding photon number distributions with and
without cheating are schematically presented in Fig. 3,
where we observe that the distribution with cheating
qualitatively resembles the target distribution.
The probability of success of this best Gaussian cheat-
ing strategy can be measured with Alice’s “maximum
control”Cmax as defined in [3], that is, the largest differ-
ence between Alice’s probability of unveiling whatever bit
she wants when she is cheating and when she is honest.
Assuming that the bit she wishes to unveil is equiprob-
able, this can be expressed as one half of her cheating
probability. Using the relations 〈P 〉 = 〈P+〉 − 〈P−〉 and
〈P+〉+ 〈P−〉 = 1, where 〈P+(−)〉 stands for the probabil-
ity to measure an even (odd) number of photons at the
4 2 0 2 4
4
2
0
2
4
FIG. 2: Contour plot of the Wigner function of an odd
Schro¨dinger cat state of amplitude α′ = 3/
√
2. Bob obtains
this state in the unveil phase if Alice has committed the bit
0 and has not cheated. The best cheating strategy for Alice
during the holding phase is to displace her proof system by√
2d along the p quadrature, so that the unveiled state is dis-
placed by −d (or the origin in phase space is shifted upwards
by d, as illustrated by the arrow). Then, the origin of the un-
veiled state is located on the global maximum of the original
Wigner function. For an even Schro¨dinger cat, the situation
is exactly analogous.
displaced origin, we can deduce 〈P+(−)〉 from the mean
parity at the displaced origin 〈P 〉 = piW (0, d). Since
Alice had committed a bit b = 0, here 〈P+〉 is the proba-
bility that she successfully cheats and unveils a bit b = 1.
Thus, in the present case, we get
Cmax ≡ 1
2
〈P+〉 = 1
4
(〈P 〉+ 1) = 0.443 (11)
The success probability of Alice’s optimal Gaussian
cheating Cmax increases with the amplitude α
′ since the
contrast in the interference pattern of the Wigner func-
tion of the cat state becomes stronger. In Fig. 4, we
illustrate this dependence as derived numerically. Note
that for small values of α′, there is a different behav-
ior for odd and even cats related to the fact that their
mean photon number significantly differs (the even cat
tends to the vacuum state |0〉 as α′ → 0, while the odd
cat tends to the first number state |1〉). For large val-
ues of α′ (& 3/2), it can be analytically shown that the
dependence simply scales as Cmax ≃ exp(−pi2/8α′2)/2,
that is, Cmax tends to 1/2 with a difference following
a polynomial dependence in 1/α′. This feature will be
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FIG. 3: Photon number distribution for (a) the committed
cat state (α′ = 3/
√
2) corresponding to bit 0; (b) the state
achieved by Alice’s best Gaussian cheating strategy; and (c)
the target state corresponding to bit 1. The symbol 〈P 〉 de-
notes the mean photon number parity, while Cmax denotes
Alice’s maximum control.
crucial in Sec. V, where we consider the asymptotic se-
curity of the protocol. It is simply obtained by using the
approximation d ≈ pi/(2√2α′), resulting from the fact
that in this limit the global maximum (minimum) ap-
proximately coincides with the maxima (minima) of the
oscillating interference term cos
(
2
√
2pα′
)
.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Α'
0.1
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0.3
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Cmax,Gmax
Cmaxodd
Cmaxeven
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C'maxeven
FIG. 4: Alice’s maximum control Cmax (one half of the
success probability of her optimal Gaussian cheating) as a
function of the coherent amplitude α′. For small values of α′
(α′ . 3/2), on the left of the vertical grey bar, the committed
even and odd cat states behave differently, that is, Coddmax 6=
Cevenmax . We also plot C
′
max, Alice’s maximum control when the
vacuum mode is also monitored by Bob in the unveil phase,
for both an initially committed even and odd cat state. Bob’s
maximum information gain Gmax (one half of the probability
of successfully determining the committed bit) is also plotted
as a function of α′.
Interestingly, Alice’s maximum control Cmax can be
further reduced if, during the unveil stage, Bob also ver-
ifies that the second outgoing mode of his beam splitter
is in the vacuum state |0〉 as it should be in the absence
of cheating. If Alice applies the above optimal Gaus-
sian cheating during the holding phase, the second out-
going mode experiences the same displacement as the cat
state, so that the probability that no photon is detected
is PNoP = exp
(−d2/2). This was irrelevant in the above
calculation of Cmax as Bob disregarded the second mode
in the unveil phase. However, one can make use of this
fact and measure the second mode with photon count-
ing in order to further improve the security of the pro-
tocol since the probability of successful cheating is then
reduced to C′max = Cmax × PNoP. We present the mod-
ified curve C′max in Fig. 4 with dashed lines. It must be
stressed, however, that the optimal cheating strategy we
derived in the original protocol (without monitoring the
second mode) does not necessarily remain optimum for
this modified protocol. Finding the optimal C′max is an
open problem.
It is important to mention here that throughout our
analysis, we have only considered the case where Alice
applies her cheating operations during the holding phase.
Alice could as well cheat in the commit phase already by
commiting a state that is different from the state |χ′b〉 of
Eq. (4) and try to change it during the hold phase. An ex-
ample of such a successful cheating strategy would be to
commit a state of amplitude α higher than the one agreed
upon and displace her proof mode at will during the com-
mit phase. In this way, and if α≫ 1, she could obviously
achieve Cmax asymptotically close to 1/2. However, the
detection of such a cheating during the commit phase
could easily be detected in the asymptotic protocol that
we suggest in Sec. V.
IV. BOB’S BEST CHEATING STRATEGY
In the previous Section, we have assumed that the am-
plitude α was large enough to guarantee that the protocol
was perfectly concealing. We will now make this state-
ment more accurate, and determine the relation between
α and Bob’s maximum information gain Gmax (as defined
in [3]) during the holding phase while assuming that Al-
ice is honest. The most appropriate measure to quantify
Gmax uses the trace distance [28]
D (ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
Tr |ρ0 − ρ1| (12)
which corresponds to the probability of successfully dis-
tinguishing the two quantum states with the best POVM
measurement, so-called Helstrom measurement [29]. If ρ0
and ρ1 correspond to the single-mode reduced states of
|χ0〉 and |χ1〉 from Eq. (3), it is easy to show that
ρ0 − ρ1 = e
4|α|2(
e8|α|
2 − 1) ((|α〉 〈α|+ |−α〉 〈−α|)
−e2|α|2 (|α〉 〈−α|+ |−α〉 〈α|)
)
. (13)
7It remains to find the eigenvalues of the Hermitian matrix
H = ρ0−ρ1, which is not a difficult task once we observe
that it can be rewritten in terms of cat states,
H = λ+ |+〉 〈+|+ λ− |−〉 〈−| (14)
with |±〉 = (|α〉 ± |−α〉) /
√
2
(
1± e−2|α|2) and λ± =
±e2|α|2/
(
1 + e4|α|
2
)
. It then follows that
Tr|H | = 2e2|α|2/
(
1 + e4|α|
2
)
(15)
and
Gmax ≡ 1
2
D (ρ0, ρ1) =
e−2|α|
2
2
(
1 + e−4|α|
2
) . (16)
This implies that Bob’s capability to optimally distin-
guish between the two states decays exponentially with
α, analogously to the behavior of the overlap 〈α |−α〉. In
Figure 4, we have also plotted Gmax as a function of the
amplitude of the committed cat state α′ =
√
2α, which
illustrates this exponential decay. We observe a trade-off
between Alice’s cheating and Bob’s cheating: the more
control Alice has on the committed state (large Cmax),
the less information Bob is able to gain (small Gmax).
This trade-off is exhibited in Fig. 5, where we plot Cmax
versus Gmax for an initially commiteed odd cat state (bit
0). For comparison, we also plot the (not necessary reach-
able) lower bound on this trade-off for QBC protocols as
derived in [3] (we refer the reader to Ref. [30] for some re-
cently obtained results on the exact bounds). It appears
that, while our protocol as such cannot be both perfectly
concealing and binding (there is no value of α such that
Gmax and Cmax tend to zero simultaneously), it enters
(for α′ > 3/2) in the area that is not accessible to QBC
protocols without restrictions.
V. ASYMPTOTICALLY SECURE PROTOCOL
The fact that Bob’s maximum information gain Gmax
is exponentially decreasing with α′ while the success
probability of Alice’s best Gaussian cheating Cmax is only
polynomially increasing with α′ can be exploited to im-
prove the security of our QBC protocol in a similar man-
ner as in the original QBC protocol of Ref. [31].
This is achieved by modifying the setting of Fig. 1 and
use a sequence (a tensor product) of N identical states
|χ′b〉 instead of a single one for the encoding. In this
modified scheme, we may assume that Alice’s best Gaus-
sian cheating strategy factorizes. A collective Gaussian
attack on N states cannot increase the maximum value
of the total Wigner function of the N states, and there-
fore it cannot give a better cheating on average. With
this argument, we can estimate that her maximum suc-
cess probability is simply C
(N)
max = 2N−1 (Cmax)
N
since
the cheating remains undetected only if all N states are
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5Gmax0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Cmax
FIG. 5: Solid red (blue) line: Alice’s maximum control
Cmax−Odd versus Bob’s maximum information gain Gmax for
α′ ≥ 3/2 (α′ < 3/2). Dotted black line: Lower bound on the
Cmax versus Gmax trade-off for QBC protocols as derived in
[3].
successfully controlled by Alice. Hence C
(N)
max decreases
exponentially with N . In contrast, assuming that entan-
gled measurements are of no use, Bob’s maximum in-
formation gain becomes G
(N)
max =
(
1− (1− 2Gmax)N
)
/2
since (1 − 2Gmax) is the probability of not distinguish-
ing the states. Hence, G
(N)
max increases linearly (at most
polynomially [28]) with the number of states N provided
that Gmax is small (α
′ is large).
Then, by choosing a large amplitude α′ so that Gmax
is exponentially small, C
(N)
max can be made exponentially
small as well by choosing a large enough N (not too large
to keep G
(N)
max small, which is possible given the linear
scaling). In this way, we can construct a QBC protocol
that is asymptotically secure in the sense that G
(N)
max → 0
and C
(N)
max → 0.
As a matter of concreteness, we plot in Fig. 6 the value
of C
(N)
max versus G
(N)
max for different values of the coherent
amplitude α′. For a given α′, the point moves to the
right for increasing N , and we tend to a protocol where
Alice cannot cheat anymore while Bob is able to cheat
perfectly. If the value of α′ is increased, the starting
point for N = 1 corresponds to a better control for Alice
and a lower information gain for Bob. Then, if α′ is
taken large enough, we can reach an interesting region
where both C
(N)
max and G
(N)
max are small by choosing an
appropriate large value of N .
In practice, achieving really small values of Gmax and
Cmax is probably not possible within the current available
technology. For instance, a security of the order of 10−5
would requires α′ ≈ 4 and N ≈ 300. More realistically, a
value of Gmax and Cmax of the order of 10
−1 would only
require α′ ≈ 2 and N ≈ 10, which may be feasible if the
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FIG. 6: (a) Alice’s maximum control C
(N)
max versus Bob’s max-
imum information gain G
(N)
max for different amplitude α
′. (b)
The same plot in logarithmic axes.
N committed cats states are sent iteratively. For N = 1,
as can be seen in Fig. 5, we are far from the secure
region as Cmax remains too large. It may be interesting,
however, to demonstrate this protocol for N = 1 and
α′ > 3/2 as it then beats any possible QBC protocol
with no restriction [3], as already mentioned.
The asymptotic protocol can also efficiently protect
against cheating strategies of Alice during the commit
phase if the parity measurement at the unveil phase is
replaced by photon-number counting. In this case, by
measuringN ≫ 1 states, Bob obtains the photon-number
distribution of the commited state and thus may eas-
ily conclude if Alice has initially commited another state
than than the states |χ′b〉 of Eq. (4). For instance, in the
case where Alice decides to commit a state of amplitude
α higher than the one agreed upon, the photon-number
distribution obtained by Bob will have a mean that is
higher than expected.
Note finally that if the vacuum mode is monitored in
the unveil phase and if for this modified protocol the
Gaussian cheating strategy we have examined is proven
to be the optimum, then Cmax may be further reduced
by a significant factor. The maximum information gain
Gmax is also expected to be, in practice, less than the
values we have calculated since Helstrom measurements
for continuous variables require the use of non-Gaussian
resources. Finding an operational measurement scheme
realizing the POVM described in Section IV or finding
a (more convenient) tomographic procedure for N ≫ 1
that achieves the maximum information gain is another
open question.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated continuous-variable QBC proto-
cols with Gaussian constraints. It had been proven in a
recent work [8] that restricting both parties to Gaussian
states and operations cannot lead to a secure QBC pro-
tocol. Here, we have gone one step further and have in-
troduced a QBC protocol that is based on non-Gaussian
(Schro¨dinger cat) states of light, thereby circumventing
such a Gaussian no-go theorem, but that still imposes a
Gaussian restriction on Alice’s cheating operations. This
continuous-variable QBC protocol is shown to be asymp-
totically secure in the sense that Alice’s control and Bob’s
information gain can be both made arbitrarily small.
Even though the Gaussian restriction we put on Alice
is not of a fundamental nature, the non-Gaussian deter-
ministic operations as needed by Alice in order to cheat
would require high optical non-linearities that are inac-
cessible today in the laboratory. In contrast, the prob-
abilistic procedures that can effect non-Gaussian opera-
tions based on post-selection, as already demonstrated in
the laboratory, can be used by Alice in order to prepare
the cat states that are necessary to initiate the protocol.
In conclusion, we envision that a restricted proof-
of-principle demonstration of this continuous-variable
QBC protocol may become realizable within the near-
future state of technology given the recent experimental
progress on non-Gaussian state of light generation [21–
23]. An interesting extension of this work would be to
devise more practical continuous-variable QBC protocols
going beyond the purification protocol investigated here,
but instead following the lines of the original QBC pro-
tocol of Ref. [31] for discrete variables, for which no en-
tanglement or quantum memory is required.
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